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Intentionality, Morality, and the
Incest Taboo in Madagascar
Paulo Sousa1* and Lauren Swiney2
1 Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK, 2 University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
In a recent article (Astuti and Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Astuti and Bloch
claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality
are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic
consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the
Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making
moral judgments relating to incest’s catastrophic consequences, they do not take
intentionality into account. Astuti and Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality
in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social
order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of
intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in
the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has
found in the US. In this article, we argue that (i) Astuti and Bloch are unclear about many
aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake), (ii) they do not
provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to
moral judgments relating to incest’s presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence
for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent), (iii) their hypothesis that conceiving of
incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality
irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv) the extension of their explanatory account to the
moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt’s well-known scenario of intentional
incest is unwarranted.
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INTRODUCTION
There are distinct, though interconnected, questions surrounding the topic of incest (see, e.g.,
Lieberman et al., 2003; Fessler and Navarrete, 2004; Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Royzman
et al., 2008, 2009; Piazza and Sousa, 2014; Wolf, 2014). One is the issue of incest avoidance, which
concerns why humans generally avoid having sexual relations with their close kin. Another is the
issue of the incest taboo, which concerns why there is a widespread prohibition against having sex
with close kin, a prohibition that in many cultural contexts extends to more distant, classificatory
kin, and is highly correlated with corresponding marriage prohibitions. A third is the issue of the
relationship between incest and moral psychology, which concerns the nature of moral judgments
concerning incest.
In a recent article (Astuti and Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Astuti and Bloch address
aspects of the second and third issues above, discussing the relationship between the incest taboo
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and morality among the Malagasy in Madagascar.1 They are
particularly interested in the extent to which considerations of
intentionality (i.e., whether an action is intentional or not) play a
role in moral judgments about incest among the Malagasy, given
that there is a widespread belief that committing incest leads to
catastrophic consequences (e.g., crops fail, canoes overturn at
sea, children die) even when incest is unintentional (i.e., when
those committing incest are not aware that they are related as
kin).2
Astuti and Bloch are leading researchers in the area of
cognition and culture. In bringing the question of intentionality
attributions into the discussion of moral judgments concerning
incest, their article speaks to traditional issues in legal and
cultural anthropology (e.g., Goldman, 1993; Rumsey and
Robbins, 2008), to attribution research in social psychology
(e.g., Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995; Alicke, 2000; Malle et al.,
2014), and to recent cognitive and neuroscientific research on
the relation between causal reasoning, theory of mind and
moral judgments (e.g., Young et al., 2010a,b). In focusing on
a specific type of transgression (i.e., incest), their article speaks
to the important question in moral psychology concerning
the extent to which moral judgments are uniform across
different domains of transgressions (e.g., Young and Saxe,
2011; Gray et al., 2012; Haidt, 2013). Last but not least, in
dealing with a “non-WEIRD” cultural context (Henrich et al.,
2010) and drawing from their extended fieldwork research,
their article speaks both theoretically and methodologically to
the issue of which aspects of human cognition are universal
or culturally specific. For all these reasons, their article is
an important contribution that deserves the attention of
anthropologists, psychologists and cognitive scientists more
generally.
Astuti and Bloch make two sorts of claims. At a more
descriptive level, they claim that the Malagasy demonstrate an
unusual ambivalence about whether the distinction between
intentional and unintentional actions affects their moral
judgments concerning incest and its catastrophic consequences.
On the one hand, similarly to the way they evaluate other
transgressions, the Malagasy consider this distinction to be
relevant: for example, a couple is not considered to be “at
fault” if they committed the incest unknowingly (and thus
unintentionally). On the other hand, when the Malagasy think
about and deal with incest’s catastrophic consequences, the
distinction is no longer relevant: everyone, including the
innocent (i.e., people who did not commit incest, let alone
commit it intentionally), is “punished” by these consequences
1Astuti and Bloch have pursued long-term ethnographic research among the Vezo
on Western coast (Astuti), and among the Merina and the Zafimaniry of the central
highlands (Bloch). Following them, we use the expression “people in Madagascar”
(or “the Malagasy”) to refer to adult members of these groups, which, according to
them, hold a similar view on the topic discussed in their paper. Later in the article,
we shall bring into our discussion some evidence from groups from southern
Madagascar (the Bara and the Karembola) to make a critical contrast, but without
supposing that Astuti and Bloch wanted to extend their discussion and hypotheses
to these other groups.
2Across Madagascar the incest taboo varies in terms of the range of tabooed kin
relations—e.g., in some parts, children of two brothers are tabooed, in other parts,
they are not.
and has a duty of reparation. According to Astuti and Bloch,
the irrelevance of intentionality when the Malagasy think about
incest’s catastrophic consequences is unusual because it goes
against the widely held assumption that considerations of
intentionality are a universal component of causal reasoning
about wrongdoing.
At a more explanatory level, Astuti and Bloch (2015, p. 1)
claim that the reason considerations of intentionality are deemed
irrelevant to moral judgments when the Malagasy think about
and deal with incest’s catastrophic consequences is that they
envisage the attack on the transcendental social order that
incest represents, and consequently become dumbfounded and
indifferent to considerations of intentionality: “This [incest]
entails such a fundamental attack on kinship and on the
very basis of society that issues of intentionality and blame
become irrelevant”. In addition, Astuti and Bloch claim that this
explanation can shed light even on the dumbfounding reasoning
concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt and
colleagues have found in the US (Haidt et al., 2000, unpublished;
Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Hersh, 2001; but see Royzman et al., 2015,
for a criticism).
In this article, we critically examine Astuti and Bloch’s
claims. Much of our criticism comes from the fact that Astuti
and Bloch are not clear enough about the various types of
moral judgments invoked in their discussion. Thus, firstly, we
provide a characterization of these different types of moral
judgments and of our view of the relevance of intentionality
considerations in each case. Secondly, we focus on Astuti
and Bloch’s claim that the Malagasy demonstrate an unusual
ambivalence in their moral judgments concerning incest and
its catastrophic consequences, arguing that they do not provide
clear evidence for this claim. Thirdly, we focus on Astuti and
Bloch’s theoretical explanation, arguing that it lacks coherence
and is not supported by beliefs about the incest taboo even in
other cultural contexts in Madagascar. Moreover, we argue that
their appeal to the notion of dumbfounding is unhelpful, and
supports neither their explanation nor its generalization to the
US context.
MORAL JUDGMENTS AND
INTENTIONALITY CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout their paper, Astuti and Bloch’s frame their discussion
in terms of an inquiry related to moral judgments of
wrongdoing, and in the context of what they take to be a
widespread assumption that considerations of intentionality
are relevant to these judgments. However, there are different
moral judgments at stake in their discussion: judgments
related to culpability, punishment and duty of reparation, as
well as judgments of wrongdoing strictly speaking. Moreover,
considerations of intentionality may not play the same role
across these different judgments. In order to discuss the
import of Astuti and Bloch’s claims about the relevance
or irrelevance of intentionality considerations in the case
of incest, we provide a brief characterization of how these
moral judgments differ from each other and of the extent to
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which considerations of intentionality are relevant to each of
them.
A judgment of wrongdoing, strictly speaking, corresponds
simply to the judgment that an action is a normative
transgression, that is, that an action has been performed when
there is a norm forbidding the action (for the structure of
deontic concepts related to this type of judgment, see Beller,
2001, 2008; Bender and Beller, 2003; Sousa, 2009; Sousa and
Piazza, 2014).3 This judgment is often unrelated to considerations
of intentionality, since ordinary norms forbidding an action
may simply specify that the action is forbidden rather than
specify that the action as intentional action is forbidden. In
other words, the irrelevance of whether the forbidden action is
intentional or not is already built into the understanding of the
norm itself. For example, suppose that destroying someone else’s
property is deemed forbidden (note that the verb “destroy” does
not imply intentionality), and take the case of a person who
hits someone else’s vase, breaking it. Given this norm, people
will judge that the person did something wrong—breaking the
vase is a transgression of the norm, whether the person did it
intentionally or unintentionally.
While a judgment of wrongdoing is the evaluation of an
action, a judgment of culpability is the evaluation of a person
for her actions and the consequences of her actions: the person
being judged culpable is attributed a blemish in their record as
a person for what she has done and caused (Zimmerman, 1988;
Sousa, 2009).4 A judgment of culpability normally presupposes a
judgment of wrongdoing in that the person being judged culpable
is supposed to have done something wrong. However, one can
judge that an action is wrong without judging that the person is
culpable. Take the example of a person breaking someone else’s
vase purely accidentally. People in general would judge that the
action is wrong but that the person is not culpable.5 Finally, it
3In this discussion, moral norms and wrongdoings are more specifically
characterized a la the Turiel tradition, that is, in terms of a type of normative
conviction that entails the sense that a transgression is ‘inherently’ wrong (see
Astuti, 2007; Sousa and Piazza, 2014). This approach to specifying moral norms
and wrongdoings, which is based on criteria such authority independence (moral
norms/wrongdoings are seen as authority independent while conventional norms
are not), is completely independent of how ordinary people would use the term
“moral” to categorize norms or wrongdoings.
4Note that there is the private judgment of culpability, which leads one to update
the ‘moral file’ of the person being judged, and there is the public expression
and communication of this judgment, which leads to the social construction
of the person’s moral reputation (Sperber and Baumard, 2012). Note also that
judgments of culpability do not correspond to judgments of moral character,
although, arguably, there is a two-way street between these judgments (cf. Pizarro
and Tannenbaum, 2011).
5There is some evidence that a non-trivial proportion of individuals take into
account intentionality (in terms of mental states such as belief and desire) when
making judgments of wrongdoing/impermissibility (see Cushman, 2008), which
apparently goes against both our claim above that considerations of intentionality
are often irrelevant to judgments of wrongdoing (or, equivalently, to judgments
of impermissibility) and our claim here that the judgment that an action is
wrong/impermissible may be detached from the judgment that the agent is
culpable in cases of pure accidents. This is not incompatible with our picture, as
we are not claiming that considerations of intentionality are in general irrelevant
to judgments of wrongdoing. The understanding of norms may vary across
norms and individuals in terms of whether what is forbidden is understood more
specifically as an intentional action or not (This variation in understanding also
relates to the level of institutionalization of norms, with the legal system tending
to explicitly build culpability qua levels of intentionality into the definition of
is important to note that the concept of culpability has a graded
structure (one may attribute more or less culpability) and that
one of the variables that calibrates the amount of culpability
is related to considerations of intentionality—if, in the vase
example, the person hitting the vase was seen as reckless, people
would attribute at least some culpability.
Judgments concerning punishment and reparation may be
subsumed under the category of judgments of liability, since
they relate to the impositions that one may be liable to when
one does something wrong—the suffering that one should be
subjected to or the reparations that one should make in light
of the wrongdoing (for a discussion of these concepts, see
Jackendoff, 2007, chap. 10; Baumard, 2010; see also Graeber,
2014, for their relation with the broader issue of debt and the
origin of money). Thus, judgments of liability presuppose a
judgment of wrongdoing. In addition, the concept of liability
has a graded structure related to the graded structure of the
concept of culpability, and, thereby, related to considerations of
intentionality too (i.e., more intentionality/culpability implicates
liability to suffer more punishment and/or to make more
reparations). Astuti and Bloch (2015, p. 2) provide an example
of graded liability judgments related to considerations of
intentionality, when they described to the Malagasy two scenarios
of a person knocking over someone else’s bucket—in one case
accidentally and in the other via a deliberate kick. While the
Malagasy deem both persons to have a duty to replace the
bucket should it be broken, liability judgments in the two cases
differ by degree: in the accidental case, the person will merely
say sorry and replace the bucket, while in the intentional case
“a fight will ensue and the victim will take the perpetrator to
the village assembly, where a more serious punishment might
be dispensed (e.g., a monetary compensation in addition to the
replaced bucket.)” (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 2; the emphasis is
ours).6
As this section has made clear, there are different types of
moral judgments, and considerations of intentionality ordinarily
do not play the same role across these different judgments.
Considerations of intentionality are relatively less important
to judgments of wrongdoing qua a normative transgression
than to judgments of culpability and liability—whereas they are
often irrelevant to judgments of wrongdoing qua normative
transgression, they are fundamental to calculate the degree
of culpability and liability, even if judgments of liability and
culpability can sometimes be dissociated (e.g., as in the above
Malagasy case where the person is seen as having a duty to replace
crimes—see American Model Penal Code, for example.). Moreover, there is good
evidence that many people engage in “excuse validation” (i.e., they hesitate to
say that a purely accidental action is wrong/impermissible because they don’t
want to suggest that the agent is culpable—see Turri and Blouw, 2015), which we
interpret in terms of a pragmatic-communicative bias that is not fundamental to
the conceptual structure related to judgments of wrongdoing.
6Some anthropologists claim that various cultural traditions adhere to a notion
of strict or absolute liability where considerations of intentionality are generally
irrelevant to liability judgments. However, these claims are somewhat confusing
and the evidence is actually weak (see Goldman, 1993; Sousa and Manoharan,
2016; but see Barrett et al., 2016). Although Astuti and Bloch allude to this type
of anthropological claim in the beginning of their article, they clearly reject the
idea that the Malagasy would constitute such a cultural tradition.
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the broken bucket even if the person is not seen as culpable
because the breaking of the vase was purely accidental).
ON MALAGASY’S AMBIVALENCE
Astuti and Bloch seem to accept that when making judgments
about the culpability of a couple for committing incest, the
Malagasy take intentionality into account. They presented the
Malagasy with a story about two adult siblings who had sex, but
who, having been completely separated at birth, did not know
they were related. They report that the Malagasy judge that the
siblings are not “at fault” (i.e., are not to blame)7 for having
committed incest because they could not have known that they
were siblings. Moreover, they seem to acknowledge this explicitly:
Whether wrong doing is done intentionally or not can thus be
taken into account even in the case of incest. But the point is
that attributing blame is a quite different concern than imagining
a world without any incest rule, where what is experienced as
necessary for one’s collective existence as human beings in under
threat. Attributing blame, in other words, is a quite different
matter than dealing with loza [incest’s catastrophic consequences].
(Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 5)
(. . .) we have also shown that considerations of intentionality are
present in the way people access culpability even in the case of
incest (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 5).
As the first passage above also indicates, Astuti and Bloch
contrast judgments of culpability with the case of the Malagasy’s
moral judgments concerning incest’s catastrophic consequences
(loza), where they argue that intentionality is not taken into
account. Indeed, Astuti and Bloch indicate throughout their
article that the principal evidence concerning the irrelevance of
intentionality comes from three beliefs (and related behaviors)
concerning incest’s catastrophic consequences:
(i) the belief that incest leads to catastrophic consequences,
whether the incest was intentional or not;
(ii) the belief that the catastrophic consequences affect
everyone (or that punishment befalls on everyone),
including the innocent;
(iii) the belief that everyone in the community, including the
innocent, has a duty to repair the damages that may
follow a case of incest.
We question whether Astuti and Bloch discussion of these
three beliefs and related behaviors provide sufficient evidence that
the Malagasy are ambivalent about intentionality in any unusual
way.
The content of the first belief does not say anything direct
about moral judgments—it just states that an act of incest
causes catastrophic consequences regardless of intentionality.
Throughout their paper, Astuti and Bloch frame their discussion
7We take Astuti and Bloch’s translation in terms of the expression “at fault (for)” to
correspond to the culpability sense of “is to blame (for).” For a detailed discussion
of the different ordinary and technical meanings of expressions or words such as
“at fault,” “blame,” “culpability,” “responsibility,” “accountability,” and “liability,” see
Sousa (2009).
in terms of an inquiry on “causal reasoning” related to
wrongdoing, but appear to be conflating two types of claims—
the claim that intentionality considerations (a type of causal
consideration, given that intentions and beliefs are deemed
to have a causal role in the production of actions) are seen
by the Malagasy as irrelevant to moral judgments concerning
incest and its catastrophic consequences, and the claim that
intentionality considerations are seen by the Malagasy as
irrelevant tomore circumscribed causal judgments concerning the
relation between an act of incest and catastrophic consequences.
The content of the first belief (that incest causes catastrophic
consequences regardless of intentionality) does confirm the claim
that intentionality considerations are seen by the Malagasy as
irrelevant to causal judgments concerning the act of incest and
catastrophic consequences, but it does not provide any direct
evidence for the claim that intentionality considerations are seen
by the Malagasy as irrelevant to moral judgments.
We shall leave aside Astuti and Bloch claim that intentionality
considerations are irrelevant to causal judgments concerning the
act of incest and catastrophic consequences, since this claim
is secondary to the topic of this paper, which is the relation
between intentionality considerations and moral judgments.
Moreover, there is nothing unusual in the fact that the
Malagasy do not take into account intentionality in making
causal judgments about the relation between the act of incest
and catastrophic consequences—what may be unusual here is
the belief in a causal link between incest and catastrophic
consequences itself, rather than the belief that this causal link
exists regardless of intentionality. One can see this point more
clearly by noticing that, in general, intentionality considerations
are not fundamental to causal judgments concerning the relation
between actions and their consequences. Take the case of
someone shooting a gun with the aim of killing a person and
causing the death of the person, and the case of someone shooting
a gun with the aim of breaking a bottle but accidentally causing
the death of a person. We imagine people in general would say
that in both cases the action of shooting the gun caused the death
of a person, regardless of the mental states involved (for some
caveats related to this point, see Lagnado and Channon, 2008).
Now, although the first belief above does not say anything
direct about moral judgments, it strongly suggests that there is
nothing specified about intentionality in the way the Malagasy
conceptualize the incest taboo, since the presumed fact that incest
causes catastrophic consequences independent of considerations
of intentionality constitutes an explicit justification for the
existence of the incest taboo, for considering that incest is
wrong. Accordingly, when an act of incest is performed, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, this should be quite sufficient
for the Malagasy to judge that the incest is wrong—the norm
(i.e., the incest taboo) is still in force and the action (i.e., the
incest) is a transgression of the norm. Although Astuti and
Bloch often frame their discussion in terms of judgments of
wrongdoing, they do not discuss at all the relation between
judgments of wrongdoing qua normative transgression and
considerations of intentionality. So, there is nothing clear in
their article suggesting that they would like to claim that the
Malagasy do not take into account intentionality in making
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moral judgments of wrongdoing qua normative transgression.
More importantly, given that judgments of wrongdoing are often
unrelated to considerations of intentionality (as we claimed in
the previous section), it would not be in any way unusual for
considerations of intentionality to be irrelevant to the Malagasy’s
judgments that incest is wrong.
Astuti and Bloch describe the content of the second
belief above in two different ways: in terms of “catastrophic
consequences affecting everyone” or in terms of “punishment
befalling everyone.” The first description does not say anything
about moral judgments—it just states that the Malagasy think that
incest’s catastrophic consequences affect everyone. Therefore,
it cannot be evidence for a claim about the irrelevance
of intentionality considerations to moral judgments either.
The second description (“punishment befalling everyone”)
does indicate something about a moral judgment concerning
punishment, and the content of third belief (“everyone has a
duty to repair the damages”) does refer to a moral judgment
concerning duty of reparation. We focus on this evidence.
The relevant content of the second belief relates to
punishment. Their somewhat implicit argument for claiming
that this content would indicate the irrelevance of intentionality
considerations to liability judgments is this: if the Malagasy
believe that punishment falls on everyone, including the innocent
(i.e., on people who did not commit incest, let alone commit
it intentionally), then intentionality judgments are irrelevant to
liability judgments concerning punishment.
This argument hinges on the assumption that the Malagasy
conceptualize the catastrophic consequences in terms of
punishment. However, it is unclear whether Astuti and Bloch’s
description of the content of the second belief in terms of
punishment (instead of simply in terms of causation) is a faithful
translation of the way the Malagasy themselves conceptualize
the catastrophic consequences, or whether it is a theory-laden
redescription by the anthropologists.
The cross-cultural evidence concerning beliefs about a
causal relation between incest transgressions and apparently
unrelated harmful consequences such as crops failing suggests
that this counter-intuitive casual relation may be understood
in three distinct ways (cf. Wolf, 2014). The first one is in
terms of supernatural agency punishment. In this instance, a
supernatural agent (e.g., spirits, gods, God) is supposed to have
caused the catastrophic consequence as punishment for the
incest transgression. The second one is in terms of automatic
punishment. In this instance, the catastrophic consequence is still
understood as punishment for the incest transgression, but no
supernatural agent is postulated to mediate the counter-intuitive
causal relation. The third one is in terms of intrinsic natural
consequence. In this instance, the catastrophic consequence is
not understood as a punishment at all, but rather as a ‘natural’
disaster that is as an intrinsic natural consequence of the incest
transgression.
Now, when Astuti and Bloch mention how the Malagasy
discuss incest and its catastrophic consequences, they do
not mention anything about the Malagasy discussing the
catastrophic consequences in terms of punishment, involving
supernatural agency or otherwise. Instead they emphasize an
intrinsic mechanistic link between incest and the catastrophic
consequences that is present even in the semantics of the verb
used to describe an act of incest:
The word that Malagasy adults will almost certainly always use
when discussing incest and contemplating its effects, is loza. The
dictionary definition of this term is “calamity” or “disaster”; the
verb for committing incest (mandoza) thus literally translates as
causing a calamity or disaster (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 3).
Indeed, the fact that the verb used to describe incest works like
a lexical causative in which the feature catastrophic consequences
(i.e., disaster) is part of the semantics of the verb counts
against any punishment interpretation, and favors the intrinsic-
natural-consequence hypothesis. To make a pertinent analogy,
to interpret “loza” in terms of punishment would be like saying
that the feature death, qua a semantic component of the lexical
causative “to kill” (to cause death), can be interpreted as
punishment for the behavior that lead to the death. In other
words, if the feature catastrophic consequences (“loza”) is seen
as an intrinsic component of incest as an action (“mandoza”), it
cannot be seen as punishment for a component of the action.8
Of course, it is still possible that the Malagasy have
different interpretations of the relation between incest and its
catastrophic consequences, one of which may be in terms of these
consequences being punishment for incest, given that beliefs
about a counter-intuitive causal relation between an act of incest
and catastrophic consequences constitute a typical reflective
belief with a semi-propositional content that is susceptible to
various interpretations by the believers themselves (Sperber,
1985, 1997). However, even under this interpretation, additional
evidence would have to be provided to show the irrelevance of
intentionality judgments to liability judgments in this respect.
The fact that punishment is seen as befalling everyone does not
show that the Malagasy think that punishment befalls everyone
equally. It may be that, in cases of intentional incest, the
Malagasy have intuitions that the catastrophic consequences qua
punishment will affect those who committed incest (or those
closely associated to them) more than the rest. More importantly,
it may be that the Malagasy have intuitions that the catastrophic
consequences qua punishment will be more extreme when
incest is committed intentionally rather than unintentionally. No
evidence concerning these points is provided in Astuti and Bloch’s
article.
Let’s turn to the content of the third belief—everyone in
the community has a duty to repair the damages that may
follow a case of incest. Astuti and Bloch seem to appeal to a
similar argument to demonstrate the irrelevance of intentionality
considerations to judgments to liability: if the Malagasy believe
that everyone has a duty to make reparation, even the innocent
(i.e., those who did not commit incest, let alone commit it
intentionally), then intentionality judgments are irrelevant to
liability judgments.
8It is also worth noting that, if the catastrophic consequences are understood
merely as intrinsic, natural causal consequences, this would easily explain why
the Malagasy believe that incest has catastrophic consequences regardless of
intentionality (the first belief described above).
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Again, it is not clear to us whether the description of the
content of this belief in terms of a duty of reparation is a faithful
translation of the way the Malagasy themselves conceptualize the
issue, or is a theory-laden redescription by the anthropologists.
Alternatively, and consistent with the alternative hypothesis
we put forward above about the Malagasy’s understanding of
the catastrophic consequences in terms of intrinsic natural
consequences, this belief may indicate simply a duty of mutual
help in situations of natural catastrophes that have occurred
or are envisaged to occur. Just think about the occurrence of
natural disasters like a hurricane in a Western cultural context
(leaving aside possible interpretations in terms of supernatural
mediation), where people in the country feel the duty to help
those aﬄicted by the catastrophe; or think about the mutual
help involved in preventing the damages of a potential natural
disaster.
Moreover, even if the Malagasy also think in terms of
duty of reparation literally, additional evidence would have
to be provided to show the irrelevance of considerations of
intentionality to liability judgments. Again, the fact that the
Malagasy think that everyone has a duty to repair does not show
that they think that everyone has an equal duty of reparation.
It may be that, in cases of intentional incest, the Malagasy
believe those who committed incest (or those closely associated
to them) should provide greater reparations than the rest for
the disasters that have occurred or may be envisaged to occur.
More importantly, it may be that the Malagasy have intuitions
that the duty to repair would be more extreme in relation to
those who commit incest intentionally than to those who commit
incest unintentionally. No evidence concerning these issues is
provided by Astuti and Bloch’s article. In fact, Astuti and Bloch
do not provide any detailed evidence at all about what is involved
in Malagasy’s reparation behavior concerning incest. The most
they say is that “. . . a large number of innocent people are
responsible for undertaking the difficult (expensive, dangerous,
stressful) ritual work that is required to repair the damage and
put things right again” (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 2).
In sum, if the Malagasy conceptualize incest’s catastrophic
consequences merely in terms of intrinsic natural consequences,
then arguably their beliefs concerning these consequences are
unrelated to moral judgments of punishment or duty of
reparation. Even if we assume that the Malagasy do conceptualize
the catastrophic consequences in terms that imply judgments of
liability, the claim that intentionality considerations are deemed
irrelevant to these judgments is not supported by the evidence
that Astuti and Bloch provide. Thus, Astuti and Bloch’s article
falls short of providing evidence for their claim that the Malagasy
do not take into account intentionality in making judgments
of liability concerning incest, and hence falls short of providing
evidence for any unusual ambivalence.
ON ASTUTI AND BLOCH’S
EXPLANATORY CLAIMS
Having posited an ambivalence in Malagay’s thinking, Astuti and
Bloch go on to provide an explanation of why the Malagasy
are ambivalent. Their explanation appeals to the transcendental
nature that they presume humans attribute to social roles and
norms: “they survive their incumbents; they extend beyond the
life cycle, the frailty, the shortcomings of any one individual
that inhabits them” (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 3). For the
Malagasy, they argue, kinship and its roles are experienced
as this form of transcendental sociality, which “provides an
image, however, vague, of a stable and lasting order and seems
to afford certainty about what people ought to do and how
they should behave—as mothers and fathers, as children and
grandchildren” (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 4). In this context,
incest “invite[s] the thought that the rules we live by may
be just flimsy fictions,” and thus constitutes a “total attack
on the social” and a threat to “the transcendental in its
entirety” (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 4). According to Astuti and
Bloch, because incest involves such an enormous breach of the
transcendental social order, the Malagasy become dumbfounded
and neglect considerations of intentionality in forming moral
judgments.
Of course, we do not think that the presumed neglect of
intentionality in forming moral judgments really requires an
explanation, for, as we argued in the previous section, no clear
evidence has been provided for the existence of an unusual
ambivalence. But even if evidence were presented to support
the descriptive claim, we would still have problems with their
explanation.
Firstly, it is difficult to see why the fact that the Malagasy
think about incest as a threat to the social order, interpreted
as transcendental or not, would lead to indifference concerning
whether a case of incest is intentional or not. Other things being
equal, intentional transgressions are much more threatening
to the social order than unintentional transgressions, for they
are an index of willingness to bypass the social order and,
possibly, of advocation of social change, whereas unintentional
transgressions do not have such implications. Hence, the
hypothesized link between thinking about incest’s catastrophic
consequences and thinking about incest’s attack on the
transcendental social order does not help explain the presumed
irrelevance of intentionality judgments.
Secondly, the nature of this hypothesized link is unclear.
Astuti and Bloch seem to be adopting some version of the well-
known Durkheimian symbolist hypothesis (Durkheim, 1965;
Skorupski, 1976), in which apparently irrational statements, like
“incest causes catastrophes,” are to be interpreted as statements
about society: “In ethnographic terms, as we have seen, incest
is said to cause loza: calamity and disaster. In more abstract
and theoretical terms, we now propose, incest is perceived as
a threat to the very fabric of human sociality.” (Astuti and
Bloch, 2015, p. 4). But the proposal that there is a symbolic
link between the idea that incest causes loza and the idea that
incest is an attack to the very fabric of society (the former being
a symbol of the latter) is not without problems. It seems to
be inconsistent with Astuti and Bloch’s own suggestion that the
Malagasy understand the catastrophic consequences in terms of
punishment for incest (see previous section), as it would entail
that the Malagasy understand incest’s catastrophic consequences
both as punishment, which supports the social order, and as
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the destruction of the social order. Moreover, as with most
symbolist hypotheses a la Durkheim, this hypothesis explains
neither why the Malagasy would use such an indirect mode of
expression (why not talk directly about destruction of society
instead of loza?), nor the fact that Malagasy’s behaviors seem
compatible with an interpretation of loza simply in terms of
intrinsic catastrophic consequences. Finally, the usual move from
those who adopt a symbolist hypothesis — claiming that the
symbolism is esoteric (the natives try to hide the real meanings
from the anthropologists or outsiders) or unconscious (the real
meanings are hidden from the natives themselves) — would
create more problems than solve them (see Sperber, 1975).
Thirdly, although Astuti and Bloch may not want to extend
their explanation to Madagascar generally (see footnote 1), it
is worth pointing out that their explanation is not consistent
with other cultural traditions in Madagascar. Huntington (1978)
indicates that, among the Bara of southern Madagascar, the belief
is that incest’s harmful consequences affect only the incestuous
couple and their offspring. It is difficult to see how these restricted
harmful consequences could be seen as symbolic of destruction
of the social order. Also, Middleton (2002) indicates that, among
the Karembola of southern Madagascar, who believe that incest
has generalized catastrophic consequences as discussed by Astuti
and Bloch, incest is not seen unambiguously as negative. She says:
For the Karembola, then, the morality of incest is highly
ambiguous. It is not, as among the Merina of the Highlands of
Madagascar, the ‘conceptual antithesis to kinship,’ ‘the ultimate
wrong’ while kinship is the ultimate right (Bloch, 1971, p. 67).
Rather, like other forms of taboo breaking, incestuous activity
releases a fearsome power (asy) that can be turned by sacrifice into
good or bad. Incest can easily render cattle sterile, cause women
to bear ‘creatures’ (biby), harvests to fail, and people to die; but,
if handled well, it can make people masine (‘blessed,’ ‘efficacious,’
‘fertile’). Its power lies in its essential indeterminacy (Middleton,
2002, p. 203).
If, among the Karembola, kinship is not the ultimate parameter
of social order and incest has such an ambiguity, it is difficult
to suppose that the relation between incest and catastrophic
consequences is conceived as an attack to the social order.
A final problem with Astuti and Bloch’s explanation is its
incorporation of a notion of dumbfounding, which, in general
terms, refers to a person being unable to explain why she makes
a specific judgment (and being somewhat perplexed by this
inability).
One issue is that Astuti and Bloch claim that considerations
of intentionality become irrelevant because the Malagasy are
dumbfounded by the attack on the transcendental social
order that incest represents, but without providing any clear
characterization of the connection between being dumbfounded
and neglecting considerations of intentionality. They say:
“(. . .) the consequences of incest are indeed understood as
catastrophic (. . .). And yet, when asked why this is so, our
Malagasy interlocutors are stumped—or dumbfounded, to use a
term used in the psychological literature on moral reasoning (. . .)
they are unable to give a single and sufficient account of the
relationship between cause (the breach of the taboo) and effect
(loza) (Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 3).
However, it is unclear to us why being unable to give an
account of the relationship between incest and its catastrophic
consequences should impact the relevance of intentionality
considerations. It is also unclear to us why Astuti and Bloch
need to posit that this dumfounding is the result of the
perception of a threat to the transcendental social order. We
would argue instead that the Malagasy’s inability to provide
a detailed causal account of the relationship between incest
and its catastrophic consequences corresponds simply to the
well-known fact that people normally do not have plain
and systematic ideas about how counter-intuitive causation
works.
Another issue is that Astuti and Bloch make an unconvincing
analogy between their take on dumbfounding and the notion of
moral dumbfounding in the context of Jonathan Haidt’s research
(see aforementioned references). “Moral dumbfounding” in the
context of Haidt’s research refers to the fact that Americans
seem unable to provide an adequate explanation for their
judgment that intentional incest is still wrong once the usual
Western objections to intentional incest are counteracted (e.g.,
the couple uses precautions against pregnancy and acts in
secrecy to avoid offending other people). Before explicating
Astuti and Bloch’s analogy, it is important to emphasize that
Haidt’s research is about people being unable to provide an
adequate explanation for their judgments of wrongdoing, in the
sense of judgments that an action is a normative transgression;
the research is not about asking people to provide explanations
for any judgments of liability. It is also worth noting that
Haidt’s research concerns only cases of intentional incest and is
unrelated to the question about the relevance of considerations
of intentionality.
Turning to the dumbfounding analogy, Astuti and Bloch
claim, on the one hand, that, like the American students in
Haidt’s research, the Malagasy would evince dumbfounding
in response to questions about wrongdoing in the context of
Haidt’s scenario of intentional incest. But, as Astuti and Bloch
seem to acknowledge in passing, the Malagasy would not have
any problem in explaining why intentional incest is wrong
if confronted with Haidt’s scenario: incest causes catastrophic
consequences even if the aforementioned Western objections
were counteracted.
On the other hand, Astuti and Bloch also suggest that
American students’ moral dumfounding can be similarly
explained in terms of the perception of an attack on the
transcendental social order: “Their dumbfoundedness signals
that what they are thinking and care about is the need to
align themselves, jointly with others, with what, ultimately
and fundamentally, makes people, namely, the transcendental”
(Astuti and Bloch, 2015, p. 6). This is certainly an intriguing
hypothesis, and they posit it as an alternative to Haidt’s social
intuitionist account, which holds that moral dumfounding is the
result of intuitive “gut feelings” that belie post hoc rationalization.
However, we find the rationale of their explanation even less
persuasive here than in the case of the Malagasy: principles of
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kinship are much less socially important in individualist societies
like the US, and there is no widespread belief in the US context
that incest has catastrophic consequences.
CONCLUSION
Astuti and Bloch are some of the few cognitive anthropologists
who combine long-term fieldwork involving participant
observation and other qualitative methods with the more
controlled tasks deployed by experimental psychologists and
cognitive scientists, and we commend them in their perspective
and the important contributions they have made. In their
recent paper, they claim that their fieldwork has uncovered an
unusual pattern of reasoning when the Malagasy think about
the catastrophic consequences that are supposed to follow from
breaking the incest taboo, and propose an explanatory account
that can both explain this finding and potentially provide an
account of the moral dumbfounding evinced by American
students when they are asked to explain why intentional incest is
wrong.
We have argued that their article falls short of providing
evidence for their descriptive claims and that there are many
aspects of their explanation that are unconvincing. We have also
argued that many aspects of their central claims are unclear.
One of our aims is to push them to address our concerns by
developing a more detailed combined methodology and a more
rigorous theoretical framework in relation to the current topic, as
they have previously pursued in relation to other topics (see, e.g.,
Bloch et al., 2001; Astuti et al., 2004; Astuti and Harris, 2008). It
is our hope that our article will instigate them to do so, as this
would surely advance our knowledge on the relationship between
considerations of intentionality, moral judgments and the incest
taboo.
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